Advocacy: Proportional Representation instead of Single Member Districts and Compulsory Preferential Voting
There are major problems with the single-member electoral district system for the House of Representatives.
Introduction.
There has been a lot of talk about the 2010 Hung Parliament producing a "paradigm shift". This is the result of major parties having to accommodate the demands of the Greens and four Independents. The phenomenon of "minority Government" is very common in countries that use proportional representation (PR). However, the term is hardly used because it is the norm to negotiate after an election to find a working parliamentary majority. Yes, that does present a different paradigm. It is refreshing to gain just a glimpse of that in Australia now but unless there is concerted action to change the electoral system we may soon be back in the adversarial mode. The conservative parties in Opposition led by Tony Abbott, already re-adopted the adversarial strategy and language the moment that the ALP-Green-three Independents agreements were in place. The Australian electoral system is largely responsible for the two-party tyranny in Australia that has now been rejected by the voters. This needs to be understood fully and addressed if a real paradigm shift is to eventuate. The Greens in particular need to consider this. So what are the problems with the current system?
a. A serious lack of diversity in representation in the Australian Parliament. This is the consequence of new parties not being able to gain representation. They may come but almost all dutifully disappear again, most recently the Australian Democrats. The 2009 Electoral Reform Inquiry's Green paper explained correctly that diversity has increased greatly in Australian society since 1945. This is hardly reflected in the House of Representatives. The diversity that exists within the major parties is to some extent expressed in factions and there the diversity refers to different ideological position. The operations of factions in both major parties have generally been regarded as negative, obscure and undesirable. It is not at all a substitute for real diversity and transparency. Frequently factionalism has given rise to the perversion of democracy, branch stacking and various forms of skullduggery, in both the major parties. The possibility of more diverse representation, through proportional representation, would reduce or remove these undesirable features. There would be greater transparency as a result.
b. The single-member district system has resulted in frequent boundary changes, a costly and often controversial process; pork-barreling, resulting in election campaigns concentrating on a limited number of marginal seats; little economic development and government assistance, or none at all, in "safe" seats. Costly by- elections are a by-product of this system. In PR (Open Party List System) casual vacancies are filled by the next on the list at the previous election. Even with Hare Clark by-elections are avoided (through the "count-back" method).
c. A highly undesirable system dominance of the two major parties. This strengthens the adversarial culture in Parliament already inherent in the Westminster system. This also brings with it the fusion between the political executive and the legislature as well as the functional amateurism of Ministers (a direct consequence of that system). In spite of the adversarial culture and posturing the major parties have become look-alikes in spite of sustained efforts to differentiate themselves from each other. Debates in Parliament are unreal and reflect political point scoring often on minor issues. If there are no actual differences in policy fierce differences on implementation will be generated.
d. Lack of democracy in representation through single-member electoral districts as often candidates are elected on the basis of around 40% of first preference votes. The result of this is that their first preference candidate does not represent a majority of electors while a large minority actually ends up with an MP of the other major party. It doesn't make sense to call this a democratic system. The idea of geographical representation by a single-district MP had some meaning in the distant past. MPs now represent a (major) party platform rather than the specific interests of constituents in a single-member electoral district, probably for the last 100 years already.
e. Compulsory voting combined with the existing voting system reinforces further the undesirable two-party dominance. It also forces the major parties to concentrate their platforms on capturing the "middle ground" (around 20% + of voters) - as a result of which they become look-alikes reducing diversity further. The over 90% voter turn-out in elections includes a very high percentage who are poorly informed, or not interested, or who are habitual voters and/or are of the view that it is not worth voting for any group other than the major parties because minor party candidates of Independents "won't get in anyway". The combination of these factors effectively blocks the emergence of new parties and new ideas gaining representation in the House of Representatives (lower houses generally). Voters pin their hopes on the ore diverse Senate where they may have some success. In practice this creates a false image of adequate diverse representation.
f. The single-member district system has definitely not been in the interest of furthering women representation. Although improving, at long last, this is still at a low level in Australia. Compared with PR systems the single-member district systems have been biased in favour of men. The Scandinavian countries demonstrate the positive effect of PR for women in particular.
g. The single-member district system is also biased against NESB candidates and Indigenous people. There are now a high percentage of citizens in Australia of NESB (I and II) origin. These groups, even after more than half a century, are severely under-represented in all Australian Parliaments. What a waste not to have these people in the Parliaments.
h. Finally, there is another very detrimental drawback, often not realised or mentioned. The two-party dominance has thwarted many efforts to amend the Constitution, now an archaic and inflexible document. Proposals for constitutional and other referendums, initiated exclusively by politicians in Australia, need the support of the major parties and their campaigns, to be accepted by the voters so as to have a chance to be passed in terms of Section 128. Unless this bi-partisan support is secured the proposals are doomed from the start. The last time this was demonstrated clearly was in 1988 when the four sensible proposals, put after two years of diligent work by the Australian Constitutional Commission, were all lost once the Liberal Party decided to reject them all.
Open Party List system vs. Hare-Clark.
This section briefly compares the Open Party List System of Proportional Representation (PR) with the Hare-Clark method and will argue that the former is to be preferred to achieve effective indirect democratic representation in a complex society like Australia. The attitude of the major parties against proportional representation is based solely on self-interest. This could change if voters begin to express support for it, better still demand it. In any case major party opposition should not deter us from examining and advocating as to what is best for Australia. To the contrary! The time is overdue for the Australian people to realise that unless they themselves revolt against the status quo, as far as voting systems is concerned at least, no meaningful paradigm change will happen. That is not only detrimental to the future composition of parliaments but it also means that any serious constitutional change will remain virtually impossible. The Australian constitution is an archaic, dysfunctional and stagnant set of rules. Just 8 of 44 amendment referendums have passed. For the last 33 years nothing has changed at all. The key to constitutional change is electoral reform, with the express aim to defuse the two-party dominance, followed by an inclusive strategy to review, possibly to rewrite, the entire Australian Constitution
The Hare-Clark PR system, also called the British system, or Single Transferable Vote (STV), has its origin in 19th century English liberalism. It was designed by lawyer Sir Thomas Hare (1859). In Australia it was adapted by the Tasmanian Judge Andrew Inglis Clark (1890s). The system was designed in a period when the party system was still in its infancy. Electors vote by giving preferences to individual candidates, later including candidates with a party affiliation. The preferencing can be optional or compulsory. Hare-Clark is used for the Tasmanian lower house (1907), most state upper houses, the Australian Senate (1948), and the ACT (1992). It has merit for small-scale legislative assemblies, including local and city government. The preferencing makes the system complex for voters and complicates counting for larger entities. It is mostly used in parts of the English-speaking world. However, the massive problems with voting for the Australian Senate are well documented . They culminated in the infamous Table Cloth election. In 1984 the division "above the line" and "under the line" was introduced allowing voters to place just a 1 in a square above the line for a party or an Independent two-candidate group. It has turned out to be a regular referendum on the earlier system as usually some 96% opt to vote "above the line". While this presented certainly a perversion of Hare-Clark, it gave rise to a lot of behind the scenes horse-trading on pre-submitted preference deals, as well as electoral crookery. There can hardly be more convincing evidence that such preferencing confuses the voting public and is not wanted. The length of counting outcomes, especially when re-counts have to be done, and the costs associated with that are further arguments against Hare-Clark. We really don't need an Electoral Reform Inquiry to establish that.
World wide, party list systems are the most common form of proportional representation. Over 80% of the PR systems are based on party list systems, mostly open party list systems meaning that voters can use their ONE vote for both the party they prefer as well as a particular candidate they prefer on that list. There is no preferencing involved in these systems. It is used in most European states, in New Zealand and in many newly democratised countries like South Africa and the ex-USSR states. There are some Mixed-Member Proportional voting systems, like in Sweden, Germany, Hungary and New Zealand. These are also known under names like "Compensatory PR", "Additional Member System", "Two Votes System" and the "German System". These are all PR systems but they combine single-member-districts for a percentage of the total vote while the rest is "topped up" with other candidates to achieve overall proportionality. The idea behind it is that an MP is available to represent a geographical area (district), as in the older single-member-district-systems (still common in Australia). Scotland and Wales also used this mix for their first elections. In these systems voters have TWO votes. To maintain single-district representation in this form seems to negate the role of local government. Furthermore the problems of pork-barreling and frequent boundary changes remain to some extent. However, most party list PR systems are not like that. They are based on multi-member electoral districts. Both varieties of party list PR result in diverse parliaments and coalition governments. It is an effective way to operate an indirect democracy. Most of the European systems have been in place for around 100 years.
The counting is simple, especially with the "Largest Remainder Formula". The total number of votes is divided by the number of seats to be filled. That is the quota. A party (or Independent) that achieves one or more quotas gains seats according to the number of times the quota is achieved. The parties with largest remainders are given the remaining seats until all vacancies are taken. This can favour the larger parties somewhat if there are major differences in voter strength but it is often a minor distortion of proportionality.
Hare-Clark supporters, including the Proportional Representation Society of Australia, oppose the party list system because it would give power to the party apparatchiks. They select the list candidates and that could then detract from true democracy. This might be the case if there were just two major parties but in plural party systems there may well be 10 or more parties. Voters would be more inclined to vote for parties, which are themselves democratically organised. In any case, even if they approve of a particular party but they dislike the candidates listed, there will be plenty of other parties and candidates to choose from. That is just one other major difference with the two-party system. Proportional representation will also result in a different political culture than what exists in Australia. Parliamentary parties seek cooperation with others to form a majority government.
Fundamental change can only be brought about if the voters demand it. The voter revolt of 2010 is not enough but it has given a taste of voter power. Nothing has fundamentally changed as yet in terms of the electoral system. We should not engage in piecemeal tinkering such as abolishing the above the line voting, or preferencing above the line in Senate elections, or restoring the donations restrictions prior to the Howard Government's changes. We need a national debate now to move forward much further than that.
A more comprehensive explanation is provided by Wikepedia, see: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htm
There are many detailed Google entries on the spread and advantages of proportional representation. The Green parties in English-speaking countries particularly have become strong supporters.
Klaas Woldring,
Republic Now Convenor